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Introduction 
One of the stark delineations of power in the international community is between the official 
nuclear powers and the rest of the world. Although it is officially denied, many believe there is a 
link between nuclear status and international influence. All five states that have permanent 
nuclear status under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are also permanent members of the 
United Nations’ Security Council, charged with preserving the international peace. While several 
smaller states have given up their nuclear weapons, the world has yet to see a permanent 
nuclear state renounce its nuclear arsenal.[1] Therefore, Britain’s forthcoming debate over the 
future of its nuclear arsenal is of great interest, not only because the United Kingdom is America’s 
closest ally, but because such a decision could have important international ramifications. 
The current British nuclear arsenal has an expected service life that extends into the mid-2020s. 
Despite the fact that the UK doesn’t need to decide about the future of its nuclear arsenal until the 
2009-10 time period, Prime Minister Blair has promised that Britain would decide the matter in 
early 2007. In light of this, this research note provides background on the existing UK nuclear 
system, the likely decision factors weighed by the British government and the positions of the 
three major political parties on the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent. 
Those who are hoping to see the United Kingdom lead the world to disarmament by unilaterally 
renouncing nuclear weapons are bound to be disappointed. While there is some pressure for 
disarmament by anti-nuclear activists, such sentiments are not widely held by the British public, 
let alone the government. The uncertain security environment combined with a preference for the 
status quo by political leaders will most likely ensure that Britain remains a nuclear power for 
decades to come.  
 
 
History of the British Nuclear Arsenal  
“We have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs…we have got to have a bloody Union 
Jack on top of it”  
—Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, 1946 
Before addressing contemporary issues, it is helpful to briefly review the history of the British 
nuclear program. Two consistent themes emerge:  
• the important political objectives achieved by Britain’s nuclear weapons. Public claims to 
the contrary, their role as a tangible symbol of the UK’s continued claim to great power 
status and the means by which to maintain a close tie to the United States has been so 
significant that, at times, specific strategic justifications for nuclear weapons have 
appeared to be a secondary consideration.  
• The closed and compartmentalized nature of British nuclear decision-making. With few 
exceptions, nuclear decisions have been taken by the Prime Minister, in conjunction with 
a small group of ministers or advisors, while the majority of the Cabinet, let alone 
Parliament, were often excluded from such debates.  
Great Britain’s nuclear program has a long history, beginning in the 1940s when Otto Frisch and 
Rudolf Peierls of Birmingham University first sent a memorandum to the government On the 
Construction of a ‘Super-bomb’; Based on a Nuclear Chain Reaction in Uranium suggesting the 
potential for an atomic bomb. As a result of this insight, the UK was actually one of the first 
governments to identify the potential of and pursue an atomic weapon.[2] Interestingly, at this 
time in the United States, researchers at the National Defense Research Council, which was 
tasked by President Roosevelt with assessing the feasibility of building an atomic bomb, were 
arguing that it was impossible.[3] Information and decision-making about British nuclear research 
was tightly controlled by Prime Minister Churchill. Setting a pattern that would characterize future 
British nuclear decision-making, Churchill relied on an ad-hoc inner circle of decision makers, 
rather than debate nuclear issues with the full cabinet. Even the Deputy Prime Minister knew little 
about the program.[4] 
The British research project, code named TUBE ALLOYS, was initially ahead of the American 
effort, which began in a disorganized fashion and lacked the urgency of the British. However as 
the resource and practical constraints on developing an atomic bomb in wartime Britain took their 
toll, British research began to flounder. Following the Quebec Agreement of August 1943, British 
researchers joined the Manhattan Project to add their technical expertise to that of the 
Americans.[5] Despite the close wartime cooperation on the atomic bomb, following the end of 
World War II, the UK soon found itself shut out of further collaboration with the United States by 
the 1946 McMahon Act which banned American researchers from sharing information on nuclear 
weapon design with other countries.[6] 
Some historians have characterized Britain’s initial decision to pursue its own nuclear arsenal as 
one that was strictly rooted in a desire to gain international political influence and sustain its great 
power status in the face of imperial decline.[7] Such sentiments are encapsulated by Ernest 
Bevin’s quote that opened this section. Although pretensions to great power status undoubtedly 
played a role in Britain’s decision to seek nuclear weapons, to cast the entire enterprise as a 
vanity project overlooks the real security concerns facing the UK in the immediate aftermath of 
World War II. Britain still had world-wide interests and commitments in their colonial Empire. In 
the years before the establishment of NATO, there was no guarantee to British policy makers that 
America would not return to isolationism as it had done after World War I. Some even saw the 
McMahon act as a sign of how quickly the U.S. could discard its wartime allies. Furthermore, 
Britain foresaw challenges in the resurgence of Germany in a decade or two as well as the 
increasingly hostile Soviet Union. As the most advanced weapons of their day, atomic bombs 
were seen as a means to cement Britain’s worldwide status, re-forge a special relationship with 
the United States, as well as defend against future threats.[8] 
The actual decision to develop an atomic bomb was taken by an ad-hoc committee led by Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee in early 1947. The full cabinet was not consulted in the matter. In May 
1949 the decision was announced to the House of Commons, but neither program cost nor 
budget details were revealed to the assembled MPs.[9] 
By the early 1950s nuclear weapons moved from being a weapon of last resort to the primary tool 
of British defense under a doctrine of deterrence. After Churchill led the Conservative party back 
to office in 1951, spending on Britain’s conventional military forces slowed and nuclear weapons 
were increasingly emphasized as the key to British security in a manner similar to the Eisenhower 
administration’s “New Look” defense policy.[10] At this stage, Britain’s primarily delivery system 
was a fleet of strategic bombers of the Valiant, Victor and Vulcan classes (collectively known as 
the V-bombers.)[11] 
Britain’s successful test of a hydrogen bomb in 1957 provided the necessary impetus to reengage 
the United States on nuclear cooperation. Based on Britain’s demonstration of its indigenous 
nuclear capability, the next year, Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower concluded 
the Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. 
This led to the sharing of warhead designs between the two countries and the decision by the UK 
to adopt an American design for their large scale production hydrogen bomb.[12] 
In the early 1960s the British government committed its nuclear arsenal to NATO for the purposes 
of defending the Western Alliance. Under such conditions, British weapons were targeted 
according to NATO plans.[13] During this period, the public justification for Britain’s nuclear 
program underwent change. Whereas in the early days of NATO, British nuclear weapons 
provided an important component of the alliance’s arsenal, by the 1960s the growth in the size of 
the U.S. arsenal had significantly reduced the importance of the British contribution. As a result, 
the British defense establishment began to justify its weapons program not in terms of absolute 
numbers of weapons, but rather as providing a “second center” of decision making. Under this 
formulation, British weapons contributed to enhanced deterrence in Europe by providing an 
additional, independent, command authority that the Soviet Union would have to contend with 
even if it thought that America was unlikely to use nuclear weapons to defend Europe.[14] 
Interestingly, Britain continued to use this public justification for its arsenal throughout the 
remainder of the Cold War, despite changes in the strategic environment and corresponding 
shifts in U.S. nuclear doctrine, raising serious questions about how strategically grounded this 
justification actually was.[15] Privately, continued ownership of nuclear weapons served several 
purposes for British leaders:  
1. It demonstrated to the U.S. that the UK was willing to shoulder a burden of responsibility 
in the defense of Europe—ideally leading the U.S. to strengthen its own commitment.  
2. It underscored British independence—signifying that the UK was not just a “satellite of 
America.”  
3. It raised Britain’s standing in Western Europe and prevented France from being the 
region’s only nuclear power.  
As Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home candidly admitted during the 1964 General Election, an 
independent nuclear force for Britain was “a ticket of admission to the top table.”[16] 
U.S.-UK nuclear cooperation took a major step forward in the Polaris program. In the wake of the 
cancellation of the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile program, the Kennedy administration 
allowed the UK to buy into the Polaris submarine-launched missile system. Under the agreement, 
the British bought the Polaris missiles from the U.S. but manufactured their own nuclear 
warheads.[17] The missiles and warheads were mounted on the British built Resolution class 
ballistic missile submarine. As a result, within the UK, nuclear responsibilities shifted from the 
Royal Air Force and its fleet of ageing V-Bombers to the Royal Navy. 
By the late 1970s, the UK’s four Polaris submarines had reached the mid-point of their estimated 
service life. Leading a small informal group of ministers, Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan 
explored the options for a follow-on system. While keeping Britain’s options open, he secured an 
agreement from President Carter to allow the continuation of UK involvement in U.S. submarine-
based programs in the form of the new Trident missile system. The decision to adopt Trident for 
the UK was announced by the new Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in July 1980. 
In keeping with the compartmentalized nature of British nuclear decision-making, Thatcher’s full 
cabinet was not consulted on the issue until the morning of the announcement.[18] By 1996, the 
Polaris-based submarine force no longer provided the UK’s primary nuclear deterrent, having 
been replaced by the new Trident system.  
Current System 
Unlike previous eras when the United Kingdom possessed a variety of nuclear delivery systems, 
Britain’s nuclear status now solely depends on its sea-based strategic nuclear force. The nuclear 
arsenal of the UK consists of three component parts: the platform, the delivery system, and the 
warhead. 
The Platform 
The British nuclear platform is the Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). These four 
submarines were designed and purpose-built in the UK as nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
carriers.[19] Each submarine has 16 independently controlled missile tubes, which gives the 
Vanguard-class the ability to carry a maximum of 192 warheads. However, due to self-imposed 
limits, each submarine carries 48 warheads when on patrol.[20] 
The Delivery System 
The Trident II D5 missile is a three-stage solid fuel rocket with a range of 4,000 miles to 7,500 
miles depending on the payload. Each missile is capable of carrying up to 12 warheads and has 
MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) capability that allows the warheads to 
engage different targets. The Trident II D5 is manufactured in the U.S. by Lockheed Martin.[21] 
Under the Trident agreement between the U.S. and the UK, the Royal Navy has access to 70 
Trident missiles held in a communal pool at the Strategic Weapons Facility in King’s Bay, 
Georgia.[22] 
The Warhead 
The warheads carried on the Trident are designed and built at the Atomic Weapons 
Establishment facility at Aldermaston.[23] Although details of the design are classified, the British 
warhead is believed to be based on the U.S. W76 design, a thermonuclear warhead with a yield 
of around 100 kilotons.[24] Britain currently maintains approximately 160 warheads for 
deployment on its Trident missiles. 
Britain’s small nuclear arsenal remains a cornerstone of its security strategy. In addition to the 
strategic deterrent role that British nuclear weapons played during the Cold War, the 1998 
Strategic Defense Review argued that “the credibility of deterrence also depends on retaining an 
option for a limited strike that would not automatically lead to a full scale nuclear exchange.”[25] 
This ‘sub-strategic’ role requires that the Trident force be able to launch a limited number of 
missiles against an adversary as a means of demonstrating resolve or conveying a political 
message.[26] To fulfill this deterrent role in the post-Cold War environment, Britain retains a 
single submarine on patrol at all times, but it does not pre-target its Trident missiles.  
The Road to 2020 
By the Ministry of Defense’s estimates, the current nuclear warhead design employed by the UK 
has a service life that will extend into the mid-2020s.[27] The four SSBNs, which came into 
service between 1994 and 2001, have an estimated operational service life of 25 years, which 
also puts their replacement date in the mid to late 2020s.[28] Since fourteen years elapsed 
between the political decision to acquire the current Trident-based SSBN force and the first boat’s 
entry into service, a decision on the future of Britain’s nuclear arsenal will have to be made by the 
end of this decade.[29] 
Should the UK decide to retain its nuclear arsenal, it is extremely likely that it will retain a 
submarine-based delivery system. The United Kingdom does not possess enough geographic 
space to support a survivable land-based missile system. None of the aircraft currently 
possessed by the Royal Air Force (RAF) has the range or capability to deliver nuclear weapons in 
a manner that would provide an effective deterrent. Furthermore, the UK is currently involved in a 
major procurement program with the Joint Strike Fighter and is unlikely to begin a new 
production/purchase program of a long-range strike platform by 2020. Finally, the vulnerability 
and detectability of surface ships, in comparison to submarines, and the existence of an 
extensive submarine support infrastructure in the United Kingdom suggests that the British will 
retain the SSBN as their nuclear delivery platform.[30] Given the history of close cooperation 
between the U.S. and the UK on nuclear issues, it is possible that synergies could exist between 
the development of a replacement for the Vanguard-class fleet and the U.S. Navy’s new SSBN 
program which is expected to begin in 2016.[31] 
Decision Factors 
Several factors will likely impact the decision to retain a nuclear capability. Among them are 
strategic requirements, treaty obligations, and cost. 
Strategic Requirements 
British lawmakers and the government will have to determine how nuclear weapons will fit into the 
UK’s future strategic calculation. Disarmament proponents in Britain argue that nuclear weapons 
are unnecessary because it is:  
• Hard to imagine a real world scenario where British nuclear weapons would be used, and  
• Even harder to imagine a scenario requiring the use of nuclear weapons that did not also 
draw in the United States, which could presumably threaten nuclear retaliation on 
Britain’s behalf.[32]  
More specific criticism focuses on the nature of the immediate threats facing the United Kingdom 
(international terrorism, failing states, organized crime) and the perceived inability of nuclear 
deterrence to effectively respond to them.[33] 
On the other hand, proponents of maintaining a nuclear force argue that uncertainty regarding 
future threats is exactly the reason that nuclear weapons are required. Unlike conventional forces, 
which have to be structured for specific missions or theaters of operation, a nuclear deterrent 
does not require knowing the enemy in advance. While the exact nature of the challenges facing 
the United Kingdom in forty years (the expected service life of a follow-on nuclear deterrent) are 
unknown at this time, the argument goes, a nuclear deterrent is flexible enough to respond to a 
range of potential aggressors.[34] Furthermore, they argue, the nuclear deterrent is not intended 
as a means of countering all threats to the security of the UK. Instead, it is focused on the 
extreme cases where the survival of the nation is at stake. 
NPT Obligations 
A second factor that will impact the future of Britain’s nuclear arsenal are perceptions of the 
requirements of international commitments, specifically the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). Under article IV of the NPT, all nuclear powers are required “to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control.” 
The policy implication of this article is ambiguous. Absolutists argue that article IV prohibits Britain 
(and other states) from “renewing” their nuclear arsenals. Supporters of this view also argue that 
by voluntarily giving up its nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom would set a strong example that 
nuclear weapons are not necessary for either political status or national security. It is furthermore 
suggested that Britain’s disavowal of nuclear weapons would provide an important boost to the 
NPT, which has come under much strain in the past year. In this line of thinking, by giving up its 
arsenal, which all nuclear powers under the NPT are theoretically obliged to do at some point, 
Britain would demonstrate that the treaty does have real meaning.[35] Advocating this view, 
former UN weapons inspector Hans Blix recently condemned the idea of replacing Trident, 
arguing that such a move makes it more difficult to restrain non-nuclear states, such as Iran, from 
developing nuclear weapons as they can claim that they are being "cheated" by the nuclear 
states under the NPT.[36] 
Alternate interpretations of the requirements under Article IV focus on the lack of a timeframe for 
the abolition of nuclear weapons and emphasize the massive reductions in arsenal size that have 
taken place since the 1970s. Furthermore, it is pointed out that none of the other nuclear 
weapons states have given any indication that they are willing to give up their nuclear arsenals. 
At the same time, would-be proliferators are acting according to their own security calculations 
and have been steadily pursuing their goal for many years. Therefore, proponents of keeping a 
nuclear deterrent capability say that neither group of states is likely to be influenced or persuaded 
by Britain’s unilateral disarmament.[37] 
Cost 
A third factor impacting Britain’s nuclear decision, and perhaps the most important from the 
British public’s standpoint, is the cost of building and maintaining a new system, both in terms of 
actual outlays and opportunity costs. Since the end of the Cold War the UK defense budget has 
shrunk in real terms. At the same time, costs for conventional equipment and personnel have 
increased.[38] 
At this point, there is no solid information on what a renewal of Britain’s nuclear arsenal will cost. 
While some hostile conjectures have put the total price tag of nuclear renewal at £20 billion, the 
underlying assumptions behind such calculations are unclear.[39] However, an order of 
magnitude estimation can be extrapolated from the current Trident-based SSBN program. British 
government estimates put the annual operating cost of the system at 3-4% of the UK defense 
budget, with total life-cycle costs, including acquisition, of just under £25 billion.[40] Based on the 
costs of developing the original Trident/Vanguard system, a replacement submarine-based 
platform would be expected to cost £15.2 billion in today’s terms. This amount would be spread 
over a twenty-year development/acquisition period, so annual expenditures would probably 
average £.76 billion per year. Given the current demands on British conventional forces, some 
argue that these resources are better spent on acquiring armored patrol vehicles, expanding airlift 
capability, buying more Joint Strike Fighters or increasing the number of destroyers or 
conventional submarines in the Royal Navy.[41] 
Objectively, replacing the Trident, at the estimated cost, is within Britain’s means, particularly if it 
continues its close nuclear cooperation with the United States. In terms of cost for nuclear 
capability as a share of the defense budget, Britain is in a far better position than France where 
the nuclear force typically requires 10% or more of the defense budget annually.[42] However, 
much will depend on how the issue is portrayed and debated publicly. Defense spending on a 
Trident replacement means fewer funds available for conventional forces. Furthermore the British 
public is increasingly resentful of having to pay high taxes for deteriorating public services. The 
opportunity costs of replacing the UK nuclear arsenal could be damaging to the renewal 
argument if opponents succeed in framing the debate as one of guns (nuclear weapons) v. butter 
(hospitals, schools, roads, etc). 
Nuclear Cooperation 
Nuclear cooperation between the United State and the United Kingdom is likely to become part of 
the public discourse on the future of Britain’s nuclear arsenal. The British nuclear deterrent is a 
tangible example of the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
The close level of cooperation between the two nations that has existed for over four decades on 
a “core” national security program is unprecedented in U.S. foreign relations.[43] As was 
discussed previously, since the 1958 U.S.-UK Agreement on Cooperation on the Use of Atomic 
Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, the two countries have engaged in a wide range of 
collaboration on training, equipment and material development, as well as information sharing. In 
2004, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair signed an agreement extending U.S./UK nuclear 
cooperation for another ten years.[44] As the UK considers the future of its nuclear arsenal, it will 
have to decide whether or not continued cooperation with the United States will be a feature of a 
future program. 
Critics of Britain’s current nuclear program argue that it is not truly independent because the UK 
is dependent on U.S. support to maintain important aspects of the arsenal. Others respond that 
the nuclear warheads themselves are built and maintained in the UK and that the UK doesn’t 
require permission from any other country to launch its nuclear weapons.[45] 
Some critics who raise the issue of the (in)dependence of the nuclear arsenal are not objecting to 
nuclear cooperation per se, rather they seem to dislike the close ties with the United States. 
Some British analysts have proposed that a replacement for the Trident be based on Anglo-
French cooperation. For their part, the French have expressed an interest in some form of 
European nuclear force. Tony Blair is reported to have had discussions to that effect at the June 
2006 UK-France summit.[46] 
While the potential for decreased nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and the UK cannot be 
discounted, particularly in a political environment where a large majority of the British public 
claims to want their government to pursue a foreign policy that is more independent of America, a 
future British nuclear arsenal that doesn’t involve the United States is unlikely. From a practical 
standpoint, it is hard to see how the technological, strategic and financial benefits that the UK 
receives from its partnership with the United States could be achieved in a nuclear partnership 




While a decision on the future of Britain’s nuclear arsenal could be put off until the 2009-2010 
period, Tony Blair has promised to make a decision by early 2007. The Blair government’s 
recommended course of action was laid out in a ‘white paper’ issued on December 4th, 2006.[48] 
Arguing that Britain cannot be certain that “a major nuclear threat to our strategic interests will not 
emerge” in the decades ahead, the government has proposed replacing the existing 
Vanguard/Trident system with a new generation of ballistic missile submarines carrying Trident 
missiles that had undergone a life-extension program.[49] In a concession to critics, Blair 
announced that the number of operational nuclear warheads would be cut by 20% to 100 and 
raised the possibility of only acquiring three new submarines to replace the existing four vanguard 
submarines.[50] 
Following the precedent of British nuclear decision-making, the actual decision to renew Trident 
appears to have been taken by a small committee that is a subset of the Cabinet. The 
composition of such a committee is unclear, but in addition to the Prime Minister, the Foreign 
Secretary, Defense Secretary and Chancellor are all likely members. There have been rumors 
that some within the cabinet privately oppose the renewal decision—including Hilary Benn, the 
International Development Secretary, and Peter Hain, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
and Wales -- which adds credence to the idea that only a subset of the cabinet had been involved 
in the decision.[51] 
The House of Commons has received a promise that they will have the ability to vote on the 
recommendation to renew Britain’s nuclear arsenal after a three-month period of public 
consultation. However, Jack Straw, the Leader of the House of Commons, has indicated that this 
vote, which will take place in February 2007, will be conducted as a “three-line whip.”[52] This 
indicates that the matter is highly important to the government. Under such circumstances, MPs 
are not free to vote their conscience; rather they are expected to vote the party line. Failure to do 
so is interpreted as a major rebellion against the party and could result in significant disciplinary 
action such as suspension from the party. In this regard, a parliamentary vote on the future of the 
British nuclear deterrent is likely to be purely symbolic and will simply validate the existing views 
of the leaders of the various political parties. As the ruling party, Labour would certainly win a 
party-line vote on the issue, even in the face of resistance from the opposition parties, which is 
not likely to happen (see below). Furthermore, with a parliamentary majority of 64 seats, Labour 
could still win a party-line vote with some defection amongst its own rank-and-file. 
The positions of the leadership of the three major political parties are a critical element in the 
upcoming debate: 
Labour 
In their 2005 election manifesto, the Labour Party indicated it was “committed to retaining the 
independent nuclear deterrent.” Technically speaking this only commits the Labor Party to 
retaining the existing Trident/Vanguard system through the current Parliament (May 2010 at the 
latest).[53] 
Prime Minister Blair has stated that he favors the replacement of the Trident system to maintain 
Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent.[54] There is currently widespread speculation about 
Blair’s likely date of departure from office, with some in the Labour party urging him to go sooner 
rather than later. Based on the available evidence, it appears that Blair will still be Prime Minister 
when this decision is made. However, Chancellor Gordon Brown, Blair’s “heir presumptive”, 
ignited a row in June when, in a public address, he expressed the necessity of retaining an 
independent nuclear deterrent. While some have pointed out that Brown’s language was no 
different from that contained in Labour’s 2005 manifesto, this was widely interpreted as a signal 
that Brown will support the renewal of Britain’s nuclear deterrent.[55] More recently, however, the 
Chancellor has vocally endorsed a replacement for Trident.[56] 
Such views are not necessarily shared throughout the Labour party. Former Labour cabinet 
minister Claire Short has criticized Brown for his support of Britain’s nuclear arsenal and has 
indicated that she and her like-minded MPs will not support Brown’s quest for leadership of the 
Labour party (and the office of Prime Minister) unless he reverses himself on this issue.[57] It is 
not clear how far these sentiments spread among current Labour MPs. However, it is important to 
recognize that during the 1980s, successive Labour party leaders were activists with the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), and that unilateral nuclear disarmament was a 
popular policy within the party at this time.[58] It is possible that these sentiments remain, among 
both so-called “Old Labour” MPs as well as younger MPs who became involved in the Labour 
party through their anti-nuclear activism. Among the political base of the Labour Party, nuclear 
disarmament appears to remain popular. At the June 2006 national conference of Unison, the 
largest trade union in the UK, the 1,700 delegates voted unanimously to oppose replacing Trident 
and to decommission the existing system.[59] 
Conservatives 
Speaking in March 2006, Conservative Party shadow Defense Secretary Dr. Liam Fox 
emphasized that the Conservative Party was committed both to retaining the current nuclear 
arsenal as well as replacing it when necessary. He also indicated that the Tories favored another 
submarine-based system.[60] In a major policy speech on nuclear proliferation given in July at the 
International Institute of Strategic Studies, William Hague, the Shadow Foreign Secretary and 
former Conservative Party leader, reiterated that the Conservative Party is committed to retaining 
an independent nuclear deterrent and that they saw no evidence that a unilateral disarmament by 
the UK would lead would-be nuclear proliferators to abandon their programs.[61] Having 
previously avoided comment on the issue, Conservative Party leader David Cameron endorsed 
the government’s proposal to renew Britain’s nuclear deterrent once the government announced 
its decision.[62] 
Liberal-Democrats 
Even the far left Liberal-Democrat 2005 election manifesto supported maintaining the Trident 
system for the foreseeable future until “real progress can be made for multilateral disarmament.” 
The Lib-Dem Defense Spokesman, Sir Tim Garden, has argued that the United Kingdom has 
reduced its nuclear forces to the minimum deterrent level and that annual maintenance costs of 
the Trident system are affordable.[63] 
As for replacing Trident, the Liberal-Democrat position is unclear. When he was Foreign Affairs 
Spokesman, Sir Menzies Campbell contended that the decision on a successor to Trident should 
depend on cost, treaty obligations, the strategic environment, and threat assessment.[64] 
Previously he had argued that “no purpose would be served nor would Britain be made any safer 
if we were unilaterally to abandon Trident.” However, in response to the government’s ‘white 
paper’ Campbell called for the UK to postpone a decision on Trident replacement until 2014.[65] 
Assessment and Conclusion 
Britain’s experience illustrates the staying power of nuclear weapons for a middle country. In an 
environment where the utility of the nuclear arsenal to respond to immediate security challenges 
can be debated, the political leadership in the UK is not willing to disarm. In attempting to 
highlight the lack of a strategic case for nuclear weapons, those opposed to renewing Britain’s 
nuclear arsenal often pose the question, “if we didn’t have nuclear weapons at present, would the 
current environment necessitate or justify their acquisition?” The answer is typically a resounding 
“no.” However, this question misses the point: Britain does have nuclear weapons. That is the 
status quo position. Disarmament proponents have to do more than just question the immediate 
strategic utility of replacing Trident. They have the burden of proof of demonstrating that British 
security, political standing and global influence will be enhanced, or at least not harmed, by total 
disarmament. This is, of course, a very tough case to make and one that, clearly, has not been 
made to the present government’s satisfaction. 
Arguments that nuclear weapons cannot deter terrorists, therefore nuclear weapons serve no 
purpose, reflect a very myopic view of international politics. A decade ago, pundits and political 
scientists were debating whether or not war was obsolete.[66] Since that time Great Britain has 
fought in two wars and is currently engaged in protracted peacekeeping/counterinsurgency 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Terrorism may be the top security challenge of the moment, 
but there is no guarantee that it will continue to be the case over the next forty years. 
Furthermore, an exclusive focus on security issues overlooks the fact that the justification for 
nuclear weapons, within government circles, has always been about more than just security 
concerns. Regardless of the immediate strategic utility, the arsenal continues to achieve its two 
key political objectives:  
• solidifying Britain’s international position commensurate with its status as a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council and  
• continuing close security cooperation with the United States.  
As long as these political objectives continue to be met by possession of nuclear weapons, 
successive British governments can be expected to retain a nuclear deterrent, even when the 
strategic or security arguments for such a move are less clear. One would expect that France, the 
other nuclear-armed middle power in Europe, would face a similar balancing of political and 
strategic calculations in looking at the future of their own nuclear arsenal, particularly given the 
patriotic symbolism that exists around the force de frappe. 
Another consideration that has not featured prominently in the public debate over Trident 
replacement, but undoubtedly weighs on the minds of government ministers, is the relative 
permanence of a decision to disarm. From a practical standpoint, once the Atomic Weapons 
Establishment facilities at Aldermaston are disbanded, the costs of restarting a nuclear weapons 
program in the future, including developing the necessary physical infrastructure and skilled 
workforce, could prove to be prohibitively expensive. A decision to renounce nuclear weapons by 
a Prime Minister deprives his successors of a tool that British leaders have had at their disposal 
for over five decades. It is not a decision to be entered into lightly. It is far easier for the Prime 
Minister and the national security bureaucracy to continue the UK’s nuclear program than it is to 
end it. 
The decision on Trident, in some respects, is a matter of course. The parliamentary debate and 
vote on the issue will be conducted under procedural rules that enforce the party line and will be 
more of a validation of the decision to renew the British nuclear arsenal than a true debate on the 
issue. The leaders of both the government and the primary opposition party (Conservatives) have 
expressed support for retaining Britain’s nuclear deterrent capability, although one cannot 
discount some politicians attempting to score political points by instigating controversy. Despite 
the presence of a vocal nuclear disarmament lobby in the United Kingdom, such sentiments 
represent a minority of political opinion. The uncertainty of the contemporary security environment 
and the inability to adequately predict the challenges of the next forty years, combined with a bit 
of political inertia, will likely ensure that Great Britain remains a nuclear power for the foreseeable 
future. 
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